## Secure, Confidential Blockchains Providing High Throughput and Low Latency



Lausanne, 27-09-2019

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### Blockchain, Blockchain, Blockchain

- Bring Transparency in a Digital World  $\bigcirc$
- Minimise the need for globally trusted third parties 0
- Cheeper and faster transactions









### Talk Outline

- Introduction  $\bigcirc$
- Scalable, Strongly-Consistent Consensus for Bitcoin  $\bigcirc$
- OmniLedger: A Secure, Scale-Out, Decentralized Ledger via Sharding  $\bigcirc$





### Scaling Blockchains is More Important Than Ever ...

CATS RULE THE BLOCKCHAIN, TOO

### The ethereum network is getting jammed up because people are rushing to buy cartoon cats on its blockchain





### Drawbacks of Bitcoin

- Transaction confirmation delay
  - Bitcoin: Any tx takes >10 mins until being confirmed  $\bigcirc$
- Weak consistency
- Bitcoin: You are not really certain your tx is committed  $\bigcirc$ until you wait >1 hour
- Low throughput
  - Bitcoin: ~7 tx/sec  $\bigcirc$





### The Promise of Blockchain

### **The Potential for Blockchain to** Transform **Electronic Health** Records

by John D. Halamka, MD, Andrew Lippman, and

MARCH 03, 2017



ADAM ROGERS SCIENCE 02.21.18 07:00 AM



### MEET THE MAN WITH A RADICAL PLAN FOR BLOCKCHAIN VOTING

A new movement says that crypto-voting can purify democracy—and eventually eliminate the need for governments altogether.

BY ANDREW LEONARD

IN A CAFÉ on the Upper East Side of Manhattan, a one-time videogame developer turned political theorist named Santiago Siri is trying to explain to me how his nonprofit

startur

world': Insurance Companies start experimenting with Blockchain blockc technology

August 16, 2018







### The Promise of Blockchain



### Transparent Decentralized Log

### Post encryptions, store keys on cloud





### This Thesis





### Permissioned

Oakland '17,'18 Sec '16, '17 HotPETs '16

### Confidentiality

**Under Submission** 

ESORICS '18





### This Thesis

### Scalability



### Permissioned

Oakland '17, '18 Sec '**16**, '17 HotPETs '16

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### How Bitcoin Works

### CRYPTOCURRENCIES

WEEK TONIGHT

1.451 9/104 101

ARE WEEK TONIGE

TONICHT LARY

GHE-LAST WELL

REF WEEK TONI







### **Traditional Banking**









### **Traditional Banking**





















































## Lottery





### Proof-of-Work

### BLOCK



### The Blockchain





### The Blockchain





### Problem Statement

- In Bitcoin there is no verifiable commitment of the system that a block will persist
  - Clients rely on probabilities to gain confidence  $\bigcirc$



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## Chapter Outline

- Bitcoin and its limitations  $\bigcirc$
- Strawman design: PBFTCoin  $\bigcirc$
- Opening the consensus group
- From MACs to Collective Signing
- Decoupling transaction verification from leader election  $\bigcirc$
- Performance Evaluation



## Strawman Design: PBFTCoin

- In Step 3f+1 fixed "trustees" running PBFT\* to withstand f failures
- Non-probabilistic strong consistency  $\bigcirc$ 
  - Low latency
- No forks/inconsistencies
  - No double-spending

\*Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance [Castro/Liskov]









## Strawman Design: PBFTCoin

Problem: Needs a static consensus group

### Problem: Scalability

- $O(n^2)$  communication complexity
- verification complexity O(n)





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- **Opening the consensus group**  $\bigcirc$
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## Opening the Consensus Group

- PoW against Sybil attacks
- One share per block
  - % of shares ∝ hash-power
- Window mechanism
  - Protect from inactive miners





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## From MACs to Signing

- Substitute MACs with public-key cryptography  $\bigcirc$ 
  - Third-party verifiable  $\bigcirc$
  - Enables sparser communication patterns (ring or star topologies)  $\bigcirc$



## From MACs to Collective Signing

- Can we do better than O(n) communication complexity?
  - Multicast protocols transmit information in O(log n) steps
  - Use trees!!
- Can we do better than O(n) complexity to verify?
  - Schnorr multisignatures could be verified in O(1)
  - Use aggregation!!
- Schnorr multisignatures + communication trees
   = Collective Signing [Syta et all, IEEE S&P '16]



### Discussion

- CoSi is not a BFT protocol 0
- PBFT can be implemented over two subsequent CoSi rounds  $\bigcirc$ 
  - Prepare round
  - Commit round  $\bigcirc$





### Problem Statement

- $\bigcirc$ will persist
- Throughput is limited by forks  $\bigcirc$ 
  - Increasing block size increases fork probability 0
  - Liveness exacerbation 0

### In Bitcoin ByzCoin there is no a verifiable commitment of the system that a block





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## Bitcoin-NG [Eyal et all, NSDI '16]

### $\bigcirc$

- Transaction verification  $\bigcirc$
- Leader election  $\bigcirc$

### But, Bitcoin-NG inherits many of Bitcoin's problems $\bigcirc$

- Double-spending
- Leader is checked after his epoch ends  $\bigcirc$

Makes the observation that block mining implement two distinct functionalities





### Decoupling Transaction Verification from Leader Election

- Key blocks:
  - PoW & share value
  - Leader election
- Microblocks:
  - Validating client transactions
  - Issued by the leader





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### Performance Evaluation

Key questions to evaluate:

 $\bigcirc$ 

- What size consensus groups can ByzCoin scale to?
- What transaction throughput can it handle?

# ByzCoin scale to? handle?



### Consensus Latency





### Throughput





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## Bitcoin vs OmniLedger



\* Configuration with 1120 validators against a 12.5% adversary

Bitcoin	OmniLedger*
~7 TPS	~20.000 TPS
-10 minutes	~1 second
~60 minutes	~42 second
erformance Gain	Linear Increase in Throughput



### Bitcoin vs OmniLedger



\* Configuration with 1120 validators agains

Bitcoin	OmniLedger*
~7 TPS	~20.000 TPS
~10 minutes	~1 second
~60 minutes	~42 second
erformance Gain	Linear Increase in Throughput
st a 12.5% adversary	Scale-Out



### ... But Scaling Blockchains is Not Easy



## Distributed Ledger Landscape



L. Luu et al., A Secure Sharding Protocol for Open Blockchains, CCS 2016



G. Danezis and S. Meiklejohn, *Centrally Banked Cryptocurrencies*, NDSS 2016



### No Scale-Out (Bitcoin)





## Scale-Out (OmniLedger) How do validators choose which blockchain to work on?

How can I pay a yellow vendor with greencoins?





Double Throughput





## Random Validator Assignment

choose the same chain

 $\bigcirc$ 104 adequately large



### • Let validators choose? $\rightarrow$ All malicious validators can



### Public Randomness is Hard



### Strawman I

- Idea: Combine random inputs of all participants.
- Problem: Last node controls output.

### Strawman II

- Idea: Commit-then-reveal random inputs.
- **Problem:** Dishonest nodes can choose not to reveal.



### Public Randomness is Hard

### Availability Unpredictability Strawman I Strawman II RandShare

Idea: Verifiable secret sharing (Feldman, 1987) 0

### **Problems:** $\bigcirc$

- Not publicly verifiable  $\bigcirc$
- 0



### RandShare

Not scalable: O(n<sup>3</sup>) communication / computation complexity



## Scale-Out (OmniLedger) How do validators choose which blockchain to work on?

How can I pay a yellow vendor with greencoins?





Double Throughput





### Two-Phase Commit





## Atomix: Cross-Shard Transactions

### Challenge:

- Cross-shard tx commit atomically or abort eventually
- Solution: Atomix
- Client-managed protocol
  - 1. Client sends cross-shard tx to input shards
  - 2. Collect ACK/ERR proofs from input shards

(a) If all input shards accept, commit to output shard, otherwise

(b) abort and reclaim input funds





### Chapter Outline

- Motivation
- OmniLedger
- Evaluation



### **Evaluation: Scale-Out**

# #validators 70 140 OmniLedger (tx/sec) 439 869 Bitcoin (tx/sec) ~7 ~7

Scale-out throughput for 12.5%adversary and shard size 70 and 1200 validators

280	560	1120
1674	3240	5850
~7	~7	~7



## **Evaluation: Throughput**





## Thank you!!

Questions?