



# **Personhood Online: Privacy, Transparency, and Inclusion for Digital Democracy**

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
Digital Democracy Workshop – November 5, 2020

# The DEDIS lab at EPFL: Mission

Design, build, and deploy secure privacy-preserving  
**Decentralized and Distributed Systems (DEDIS)**

- **Distributed:** spread widely across the Internet & world
- **Decentralized:** independent participants, no central authority,  
*no single points of failure or compromise*

Overarching theme: building decentralized systems  
that **distribute trust** widely with **strongest-link security**



Why Digital Democracy?

why?

# Greater Convenience



[Kenneth Hacker, The Progressive Post]

# Richer Participation

Direct + Representative = Delegative Democracy




[Ehud Shapiro, Open Transcripts]

# Online Self-Governance

Can digital forums and communities self-govern?



# Democracy Needs a Foundation



[Michalis Kountouris, Michael Cacoyannis Foundation]

# Democracy's Foundation is People



[Encyclopedia Britannica]



# Democracy's Foundation is People

## Democracy

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WRITTEN BY

**Robert A. Dahl**

Sterling Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Yale University. Author of *Democracy and its Critics* and others.

[See Article History](#)

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**Democracy**, literally, rule by the people. The term is derived from the **Greek** *dēmokratiā*, which was coined from *dēmos* (“people”) and *kratos* (“rule”) in the middle of the 5th century BCE to denote the **political systems** then existing in some Greek **city-states**, notably **Athens**.

[[Encyclopedia Britannica](#)]

# Digital Democracy has a Problem...



[IBM/The Atlantic]

# People are Physical, not Digital




[Marcus Feldthus]

# People Aren't Online, Only Profiles



[Pixabay, The Moscow Times]

# Online, the People are Fake



[Ian Sample, The Guardian]

# Their Followers are Fake

## Buy Twitter Followers Now

*It's the easiest foolproof way to get active followers, period.*

500+ Followers	1,000+ Followers	2,500+ Followers	5,000+ Followers
\$10	\$17	\$29	\$49
Delivered in 1 - 2 Days	Delivered in 2 - 3 Days	Delivered in 5 - 7 Days	Delivered in 10 - 14 Days
Active & High Quality	Active & High Quality	Active & High Quality	Active & High Quality

Click here for larger plans

[Ren LaForme, Poynter]

# The News is Fake



[Krista Kennell, The Atlantic]

# The Reviews are Fake



## 100% Genuine Snake Oil

By: [Scammer's Warehouse](#)

★★★★★  42 customer reviews

Price: **\$89.70** ✓ *Prime*

★★★★★ **AMAZING** healing qualities

By: [Fake Jim](#) on June 19, 2017

Item: Snake oil, 4 oz.


Very good product. I can't prove this for certain, but I think it cured my cancer. I feel like I'm 17 again.

**HUSTLE**

[[Mat Venn](#), Medium]



# The Likes are Fake




[Rabbit Consulting Group]



**LIFE IN PIXELS** | DEC. 26, 2018

# How Much of the Internet Is Fake? Turns Out, a Lot of It, Actually.

By Max Read [@max\\_read](#)



[Ayatgali Tuleubek, Intelligencer]

# What Is the Missing Foundation?



[All About Healthy Choices]


# Maybe Digital Identity – *Right?*



[UNCTAD]

# Self-Sovereign Identity, Maybe?

DIDs enable digitally signed **verifiable claims**




# Digital Identity is a Red Herring



noun

- 1 a dried smoked herring, which is turned red by the smoke.
- 2 something, esp. a clue, that is or is intended to be misleading or distracting : *the book is fast-paced, exciting, and full of red herrings*. [ORIGIN: so named from the practice of using the scent of red herring in training hounds.]

# At Best It's the Wrong Tool



[Frits Ahlefeldt]

# At Worst It's a Siren's Song



[Herbert James Draper, Wikipedia]



# Digital Identities are Just More Profiles



[UK Government Digital Service]

# In Democracy, All People are Equal




[Tricentis]

# Profiles Distinguish & Divide People



[Tom Perrett, Arkbound]

# ID Documents are Forgeable



[Android Fake ID Card Creator]

# All IDs Can Be Lost, Stolen



[Andrés Aneiros]

# ID Demands Exclude People

## REFUGEES



# ID Demands Invade Privacy



[Charles J. Sykes, Hoover Institution]

# Personas or Alter Egos are Normal



[The Face]



# Work, Home, Hobby, Secret Identities



[Fast Company]

# Proof of Personhood

A mechanism to verify **people**, not **identities**

- For online forums, voting, deliberation, ...

Key goals:

- **Inclusion**: any *real human* may participate
- **Equality**: one person, one vote
- **Security**: protect both individuals & collective
- **Privacy**: free expression, association, identity
  - Including freedom of multiple unlinkable personas!



# Proof of Personhood

Preprint: <https://bford.info/pub/soc/personhood/>

## Identity and Personhood in Digital Democracy: Evaluating Inclusion, Equality, Security, and Privacy in Pseudonym Parties and Other Proofs of Personhood

Bryan Ford

Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne (EPFL)

November 4, 2020

# A Few Broad Approaches

## Proofs of Identity

- ID documents, biometrics, self-sovereign ID

## Proofs of Investment

- CAPTCHA, proof of work, proof of stake

## Proofs of Personhood

- Pseudonym parties – online or offline

# Why not Proofs of Investment?

They're permissionless and privacy-preserving!



[Paul Gregoire, The Big Smoke]

# CAPTCHAs: Invest Human Time



[Prince & Isasi, Cloudflare]

- Getting harder due to AI recognition attacks
- Excludes many real people with disabilities
- Fails equality test: just solve more CAPTCHAs!

# Proof of Work: Invest Computation



[Getty Images, BBC News]

- Fails equality test: just buy & burn more energy!

# Proof of Stake: Invest Currency



[[BitcoinWiki](#)]

- Buy existing cryptocurrency, *stake* it for some time
- Earn rewards proportional to amount of stake
- Fails equality test: just buy & stake more currency!



# Proofs of Investment



[Economist]

Suitable for [digital] democracy only if our goal is  
**“one dollar, one vote”**

# Proofs of Personhood

Can we achieve “one person, one vote” online?

- Pseudonym Parties [[Ford, 2008](#)]
- Encounter [[Brenzikofer, 2018](#)]
- BrightID [[Sanders, 2018](#)]
- Dunitier [[2018](#)]
- Idena [[2019](#)]
- HumanityDAO [[Rich, 2019](#)]
- Pseudonym Pairs [[Nygren, 2019](#)]

# Pseudonym Parties

Periodic **in-person** events, like *Landsgemeinde*




# Pseudonym Parties

...perhaps spread out a bit more in current times



# Pseudonym Parties


Used not for making decisions immediately but only giving each attendee *one digital PoP token*



# One Person, One Token

How to ensure each person gets *only one* token?


- Attendees gather in **lobby** area by a deadline
- At deadline entrances close, *no one else gets in*
- Each attendee gets one token *while leaving*



# Regular Synchronized Events

Federation of PoP groups might hold *concurrent* events with *simultaneous* arrival deadlines

- No one can physically attend two at once



# Using PoP tokens

Between events, attendees might use tokens for

- Voting in online governance & deliberation
- Bypassing CAPTCHAs in online services
- Minting “basic income” in UBI cryptocurrency

Platforms might use PoP tokens for

- Counting only *unique humans* in likes, followers
- Allowing anonymous but accountable access



# The Coercion, Vote-Buying Problem

How can we know people vote their **true intent** if we can't secure the environment they vote in?



# The Coercion, Vote-Buying Problem

Both **Postal** and **Internet** voting are vulnerable!

*Election Fraud in North  
Carolina Leads to New Charges  
for Republican Operative*

**The New York Times**

July 30, 2019



# Anti-Coercion with Fake Tokens

Each attendee gets brief time in a **privacy booth**

- Out of any coercer's control or surveillance



[Liz Sablich, Brookings]

# Anti-Coercion with Fake Tokens

Each attendee gets both **real** & **decoy** tokens

- Give decoy tokens to kids, sell them
- Both “work” – but only real ones **count**
- Only the **true voter** knows which is which




# Summary of Alternatives

Approach	<i>Inclusive</i>	<i>Equal</i>	<i>Secure</i>	<i>Private</i>
Government Identity	-	?	?	-
Biometric Identity	?	✓	?	-
Self-Sovereign Identity	?	?	✓	-
Proof of Investment	✓	-	✓	✓
Social Trust Networks	-	?	-	-
Threshold Verification	?	-	?	?
Pseudonym Parties	✓	✓	✓	✓

# Social Trust Verification

Detect fake identities by social graph analysis


- Addresses one particular **Sybil region** attack...



# Social Trust Verification

Detect fake identities by social graph analysis

- ...but not other realistic scenarios, like this:



# Threshold Identity Verification

Assign groups of identities to verify each other



[encointer]



# Threshold Identity Verification

Unfortunately, attackers can hire “minions” to help

- From elastic hiring services like [TaskRabbit](#)
- Needs fewer minions than Sybil identities
- Attacker’s advantage grows until takeover



[Hans Haput, Vamers]

# Public Spaces Key to Digital Spaces?

Occasional **public** events in **public** spaces may enable and secure our **digital online** spaces

- Many questions and challenges remain



# Conclusion

Digital democracy needs proof of personhood

- Must be **inclusive, equal, secure, private**
- Pseudonym parties & others being developed

Preprint: <https://bford.info/pub/soc/personhood/>

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Evaluating Inclusion, Equality, Security, and Privacy in  
Pseudonym Parties and Other Proofs of Personhood**

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