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To my knowledge there are currently only two fundamentally distinct approaches to achieving strong anonymity online, and the same legendary computing figure, David Chaum, pioneered both. His first approach, mixes, relay messages over multi-hop paths around the network to obscure their source and destinations. State-of-the-art deployed anonymity systems such as Tor are highly evolved and performance-optimized variants of this basic relaying idea.
Chaum’s second approach, dining cryptographers, instead uses information-coding principles to hide the sender of a message among a group of nodes all of whom seem to be spewing gibberish at once. It’s as if you are listening to a crowd speaking in tongues but what you hear is a single unified voice, emanating from no one in particular, elucidating the Ten Commandments with perfect clarity. Chaum then moved away from anonymity systems to other projects such as the first major attempt at practical electronic cash (yes, he was also the “first” Satoshi Nakamoto), and secure electronic voting systems. While several research projects, including Cornell’s Herbivore and my own Dissent have made progress toward making the dining cryptographers practical, it has not (yet) made it into widely-deployed systems.
Given Chaum’s status as “the father of online anonymity”, it stands to reason that his first venture back into anonymity in many years would get some attention. Today at Real World Crypto, he presented cMix, an interesting new take on the mix approach that aims to achieve better scalability, lower latencies, and sufficiently low computation costs on client devices to be practical for use in energy-conscious mobile phone apps. I had the pleasure of learning about cMix directly from David and discussing it with him at some length last year, but my recent move to EPFL and other time demands prevented me from being able to take a more active role in the project. The design of cMix is definitely interesting and contains some promising ideas, but that is not what this blog post is about.
Earlier today before Chaum’s talk, Wired also released an article on it containing a statement that will doubtless attract a lot more attention than anything in the technical paper on cMix:
Chaum is also building into PrivaTegrity another feature that’s sure to be far more controversial: a carefully controlled backdoor that allows anyone doing something “generally recognized as evil” to have their anonymity and privacy stripped altogether.
Well before Chaum’s talk even began, Twitter was ablaze with discussion about Chaum’s “backdoor” in PrivaTegrity.
The main benefit of Chaum's new system, as far as I can tell, is that it is a political gift to FBI Director Comey. https://t.co/64Au0lXxuL— Christopher Soghoian (@csoghoian) January 6, 2016
I'm heartbroken to see that Chaum is proposing key escrow for everyone on the planet: https://t.co/zWZ3bUQsJf What happened to David Chaum?— Jacob Appelbaum (@ioerror) January 6, 2016
One important observation, however, is that the word “backdoor” appears nowhere in the actual technical paper on cMix written by Chaum and his collaborators. While cMix is the anonymous communication protocol Chaum is proposing, PrivaTegrity is a larger system built on cMix to provide anonymous chat and other anonymous interaction applications directly usable to ordinary users. In essence, cMix is just an “engine” whereas PrivaTegrity is the car. So where is this supposed “backdoor” &emdash; in the engine or the car?
The only part of the technical cMix paper that even suggests the “backdoor” idea (without using that term) is section IX.B., two brief paragraphs on the paper’s second-to-last page. The first is the most crucial:
Independent from cMix, PrivaTegrity addresses potential
abuse of anonymity services by establishing a trust model that offers a balance of anonymity and accountability. On the one hand, PrivaTegrity aims to provide privacy at a technical level that is not penetrable by nation states. On the other hand, PrivaTegrity aims to provide integrity, both prior restraint and accountability after the fact, that is inescapably tied to individuals. Only if all of the mixing nodes cooperate, can the senders and receivers of messages be linked or identified.
In essence, cMix routes users’ messages through a series of mixing nodes (the Wired article talks about nine servers in different countries), such that none of the servers can individually unmask an anonymous user, but all of the servers (or their operators) together can unmask a user that they collectively agree to be deserving of such treatment.
This property is by no means new, unusual, or unique to cMix, however: in fact a huge number of cryptographic and distributed systems have this essential security property. No one really knows how to build secure systems in which you need to trust no one at all. Instead the best we can really do is to split trust across multiple entities that we hope are at least somewhat independent, so that no one entity needs to be fully trusted.
This is exactly the same security principle that motivates safes with two keys. If both keys are required to open the safe and are held by different employees, then a single dishonest employee working alone will be unable to raid it without somehow aquiring the other key. But if the two key-holders conspire, the two-key mechanism will do nothing to stop them.
Essentially all of the practical anonymity systems, both deployed and proposed in research, embody this limited trust-splitting property in some fashion. Several years ago my group coined the term “anytrust” for this security model in the context of anonymity systems, because users need only assume that “any one” of the servers is honest and not colluding with all the others against them. Users don’t even need to know or guess which server is honest; one merely needs to exist. Once again, we did not by any means invent this security model; it has been in use in many ways and under many names for decades in cryptography and distributed systems practice.
Users of the well-known Tor anonymity system, for example, depend for their security on a small group of directory authorities &emdash; of which there are currently 10 &emdash; to keep track of and let Tor clients know the set of relays available to help anonymize their messages. If …
is Chaum’s “backdoor” a technical feature? no, just a common architectural weakness.
Tor has it… (examples)
Can we eliminate such trusted server groups? Yes, but it’s hard.
Does CT fix it? Not quite.
The policy question: are backdoors needed/good in an anonymity systems?
What would the processes be for controlled deanonymization of a user, supposing one created a system and set it up like Chaum’s on the (policy) basis that server operators would cooperate to deanonymize users under “the right conditions”?
who picks those 9 server operators? Who funds them? (The power of the purse is strong…) If a nation-state comes to them and says, “we’ll block your service and thus destroy a big part of your legal business unless you help us deanonymize these people who we call ‘terrorists’ but the rest of the world calls ‘political dissidents’“, what do they do?
sybil problem, multiple possible levels of response…